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I.  Introduction 
"Better that ten guilty men escape, than that one innocent suffer."1 
In 1981 Julius Ruffin was found guilty of rape and sodomy in a 
Virginia court.2  A white female nursing student was the victim of a rape, 
and Ruffin, an African-American male, worked at the same Virginia 
Hospital as the victim.3  At trial, the victim testified she was certain that 
Ruffin was the perpetrator.4  Ruffin’s girlfriend testified he was with her the 
night in question, but the scientific testing performed on the semen sample 
displayed a high probability that Ruffin was a match.5  Despite Ruffin’s 
proclamations of his innocence and an alibi witness, after two hung jury 
trials Ruffin was sentenced to life in prison.6  In 2003, DNA testing 
                                                                                                                 
 1. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 289 (William 
Draper Lewis ed., The Lawbook Exchange 2008) (1795). 
 2. The Innocence Project, Know the Cases on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations:  
Profile of Julius Ruffin, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/250.php (last visited Mar. 
23, 2011) (describing the case profile on Julius Ruffin out of Virginia) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also The Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project, Case 
Profile on Julius Ruffin, http://www.exonerate.org/case-profiles/julius-ruffin/ (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2011) (providing a detailed description of Julius Ruffin’s story and the events 
leading up to his wrongful incarceration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 3. See supra note 2 (describing the wrongful conviction and exoneration of Julius 
Ruffin). 
 4. The victim was attacked at her apartment. Weeks later she saw Ruffin walking 
onto an elevator in the Medical School where she was a nurse and Ruffin was a maintenance 
worker. She immediately called the police and identified Ruffin as her assailant.  Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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exonerated Ruffin.7  An innocent man spent twenty-one years in prison 
based almost entirely on one erroneous eyewitness identification.8  
"[T]here is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being 
who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the 
one!’"9  Over the last twenty years, researchers have made significant 
scientific advances that bring to light the reliability problems inherent in 
eyewitness identifications.10  This research reveals that many of the factors 
affecting eyewitness identification reliability are counterintuitive and many 
jurors’ assumptions about how memories are created are actively wrong.11  
One study estimated that half of all wrongful convictions result from false 
identifications.12  Despite this, jurors often find eyewitness testimony very 
convincing and most believe that it is reliable.13 
However, Federal Evidence Rule 40314 grants federal judges wide 
discretionary power to exclude eyewitness identification expert testimony 
highlighting these reliability issues.  It is thus important to examine the 
purpose and language of the federal rule that judges are using to block this 
now well-established body of research from coming into our nation’s 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. ("Not only was Ruffin excluded, but another incarcerated man, in prison for 
rape, was linked to the sample.").  
 9. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979)). 
 10. The Supreme Court has held that identifications which occur under questionable 
circumstances should not be admitted at trial.  See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 
(1977) ("[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification 
testimony. . . .").  "[T]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of 
criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification."  Id. at 119 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967)). 
 11. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that 
"factors bearing on eyewitness identifications may be known only to jurors, or may be 
imperfectly understood by many, or may be contrary to the intuitive beliefs of most" 
(quoting People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 720 (Cal. 1984))). 
 12. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years in the Life of an Expert Witness, 10 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 241, 243 (1986). 
 13. PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 19 (1965); 
see also Watkins, 449 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[M]uch eyewitness 
identification evidence has a powerful impact on juries. Juries seem most receptive to, and 
not inclined to discredit, testimony of a witness who states that he saw the defendant commit 
the crime."); Manson, 432 U.S. at 120 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[J]uries unfortunately are 
often unduly receptive to [identification] evidence . . . ."). 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence."). 
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courtrooms.  Is Federal Evidence Rule 403 being used as a weapon against 
the admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony? 
This Note will begin by briefly summarizing the recent scientific 
findings in the area of eyewitness identification.15  This overview will focus 
principally on the counterintuitive weak correlation between eyewitness 
confidence and accuracy.16  Additionally, the eyewitness identification 
section will conclusively demonstrate that the "alternatives" to eyewitness 
identification expert testimony are unacceptable and ineffective.17  An 
analysis of the purpose and history behind Federal Evidence Rule 40318 will 
then set the stage for an in-depth examination of the current federal circuit 
court split regarding the admission of eyewitness identification expert 
testimony.19  This Note divides the current treatment of eyewitness expert 
testimony in the federal circuit courts into three categories:  the Majority 
Approach,20 the Progressive Minority,21 and the Per Se Inadmissible 
Approach.22  The analysis then delves deeper into how each of the three 
approaches uses Federal Evidence Rule 403 to exclude eyewitness 
identification expert testimony.23  Part V of this Note advocates for reform 
in the area of Federal Evidence Rule 403 and eyewitness identification 
expert testimony admissibility.24  This Note proposes and assesses both a 
legislative solution25 in the form of a specialized relevance rule and a 
judicial solution26 in the form of the global adoption of the Progressive 
Minority approach.  After analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See infra Part II (summarizing the recent scientific findings that are often the 
subject of an eyewitness identification expert’s testimony).  
 16. See infra Part II.B (expanding on the weak confidence-accuracy correlation and 
confidence malleability).  
 17. See infra Part II.C (describing the ineffectiveness of cross-examination and jury 
instructions as alternatives to eyewitness expert testimony).  
 18. See infra Part III (examining Federal Evidence Rule 403’s legislative history and 
purpose).  
 19. See infra Part IV (summarizing the current federal circuit court split regarding the 
admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony and dividing the approaches into 
three categories). 
 20. Infra Part IV.B. 
 21. Infra Part IV.C.  
 22. Infra Part IV.D.  
 23. Infra Part IV.E. 
 24. See infra Part V.A–C (describing potential solutions to this problem and making a 
recommendation as to which solution is the best). 
 25. Infra Part V.B. 
 26. Infra Part V.A. 
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alternative, this Note will demonstrate that the legislative solution is the 
superior alternative.27  In the area of eyewitness identification expert 
testimony admissibility, the time has come for a limitation on the 
unfettered discretion given to federal judges under Federal Evidence Rule 
403. 
II.  Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony 
A.  General Overview 
Eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of wrongful 
convictions in the United States.28  Studies reveal that today nearly 80,000 
suspects continue to be targeted every year based on eyewitness 
identification with a roughly forty percent rate of misidentification.29  
However, despite decades of research consistently revealing the inherent 
unreliability of eyewitness identification,30 federal courts remain hostile 
towards expert testimony explaining the unreliability of eyewitness 
identifications.31 
Expert testimony on eyewitness identification attempts to reveal to 
the jury the complex psychological issues pertaining to perception and 
memory which contribute to the unreliability of eyewitness 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Infra Part V.C. 
 28. The Innocence Project, Fact Sheet on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2011) (finding that "Eyewitness [m]isidentification [t]estimony was a 
factor in 74 percent of post-conviction DNA exoneration cases in the U.S.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. See Henry Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the 
Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CT. L. REV. 2, 4 (2007) (describing the 
overwhelming amount of research and data indicating that erroneous eyewitness 
identification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions); A.G. Goldstein, J.E. Chance & 
G.R. Schneller, Frequency of Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases:  A Survey of 
Prosecutors, 27 BULL. PSYCHOL. SOC’Y 71, 74 (Jan. 1989) (same). 
 30. See Loftus, supra note 12, at 243 (citing a 1983 Ohio State University doctoral 
dissertation explaining that erroneous eyewitness identification is the most common reason 
for the conviction of innocent people).  See generally HADYN D. ELLIS, PRACTICAL ASPECTS 
OF FACE MEMORY IN EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY  12–13 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus 
eds., 1984); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 21 (1979); A. DANIEL YARMEY, 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 57 (1979). 
 31. See infra Part IV.B (explaining that the majority approach in the federal circuit 
courts is to regularly exclude eyewitness identification expert testimony); see also Fradella, 
supra note 29, at 4 ("[T]his article is devoted to explaining why courts must change their 
traditional hostility to expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony.").  
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identifications.  This expert testimony is extremely important because the 
scientific research on memory and eyewitness identification is "quite 
counterintuitive and hardly commonsensical."32  A common fear 
regarding eyewitness expert testimony is that it will "usurp the role of the 
jury" and the expert will merely attempt to judge the credibility of a 
particular witness.33  However, the eyewitness expert is not brought in to 
judge the accuracy or believability of a particular eyewitness; rather the 
expert provides the jury with critical information about the scientific 
findings in this area with which jurors can then make a more informed 
decision.34  Eyewitness identification experts can potentially testify about 
numerous factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification 
including suggestive line-up procedures,35 the weak confidence-accuracy 
correlation,36 the exposure duration,37 cross-racial identification,38 weapon 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See Fradella, supra note 29, at 24 (citing Edward Stein, The Admissibility of 
Expert Testimony About Cognitive Science Research on Eyewitness Identification, in 2 LAW, 
PROBABILITY & RISK 295, 300 (2003)). 
 33. See, e.g., infra notes 181–83 and accompanying text (describing how the Smithers 
district court felt eyewitness expert testimony would "invade the province of the jury" and 
thus should be excluded). 
 34. See Fradella, supra note 29, at 23 ("The function of the expert here is not to say to 
the jury—‘you should believe or not believe the eyewitness.’"). 
 35. See, e.g., S. Sporer, S. Penrod, D. Read & B. Cutler, Choosing, Confidence, and 
Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness 
Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. No. 3 315, 316 (1995) (describing how police 
instructions can influence a witness’s willingness to make an identification and the 
likelihood the witness identifies a particular person).  Additionally, the more members of a 
lineup that closely resemble the suspect, the more likely the identification will be accurate.  
Id. 
 36. See infra Part II.B (summarizing the confidence accuracy correlation). 
 37. See, e.g., Sporer et al., supra note 35, at 316 ("The less time an eyewitness has to 
observe an event, the less well he or she will remember it."). 
 38. Generally, cross-racial identifications are less reliable than same race 
identifications.  See, e.g., Fradella, supra note 29, at 14 ("The result of cross-racial bias is a 
higher rate of false positive identifications, especially when a Caucasian eyewitness 
identifies an African-American suspect."); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 79 (2008) ("Social science studies have long shown that cross-racial 
identifications are particularly error prone."); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-
Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification:  What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 230, 231 (2001) ("[A] Black innocent suspect has a 56% greater chance of being 
misidentified by a White eyewitness than by a Black eyewitness."); see also The Innocence 
Project, Fact Sheet on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, http://www.innocence 
project.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php (last visited Mar. 23, 
2011) (finding that "[e]yewitness [m]isidentification [t]estimony was a factor in 74 percent of 
post-conviction DNA exoneration cases in the U.S.") (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  The project also noted that at least 40% of the eyewitness identifications 
involved a cross-racial identification.  Id. 
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focus,39 the impact of "double identification,"40 the effect of "post event 
information" on an eyewitness,41 event violence, the "relation-back" 
effect,42 and the stress level of the eyewitness, among many others.43  For 
the narrow purposes of this Note, I will expand only on the findings in the 
area of the confidence-accuracy correlation.  This Note focuses on the 
confidence-accuracy correlation for two important reasons.  First, it is one 
of most striking topics of eyewitness expert testimony because it is 
extremely counterintuitive.  Second, unlike many other areas of eyewitness 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 333–34 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining 
that the "presence of a dangerous weapon can weaken one’s ability to recall other aspects of 
a remembered scene, including individuals present therein").  Because most people are not 
exposed to deadly weapons very often there is "a survival instinct that draws one’s attention 
to potentially threatening objects" and makes recalling a particular individual more difficult.  
Id. at 338. 
 40. See, e.g., id. at 333–34 (explaining "‘double identification’ as a problem in 
determining whether one’s memory derives from one of two or more possible visual 
exposures to an object").  "[S]uch post-event information can become incorporated with the 
original memory, creating an inaccurately ‘remembered’ association between the image and 
its source." Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Peter Cohen, How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 246 (1996) (explaining 
that access to facts after an occurrence can, under some circumstances, "change a witness’s 
memory and even cause nonexistent details to become incorporated into a previously 
acquired memory"); Fiona Gabbert et al., Memory Conformity: Can Eyewitnesses Influence 
Each Other’s Memories For An Event?, 17 APPLIED COGN. PSYCHOL. 533, 540 (2003) 
(finding that when witnesses discuss events with one another, shared false recollections can 
result); Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony and Event Perception, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. 
REV. 7, 9–10 (1987) (same). 
An experiment conducted by Elizabeth Loftus also illustrates the way that "post-event 
information" can actually change one’s memory of an event.  Loftus, supra note 41, at 9–10.  
Two groups of witnesses were shown a film in which a car made a right-hand turn without 
stopping at a stop sign and caused a multicar accident.  Id. After the film the first question 
for one group was, "How fast was car A going when it ran the stop sign?"  Id.  The first 
question for the second group was, "How fast was car A going when it turned right?"  Id.  
The last question for both groups was whether they actually saw a stop sign.  Id.  53% of the 
first group reported they had seen a stop sign; only 35% of the second group responded that 
they had seen the sign.  Id.  This suggests that the use of the words "stop sign" increased the 
likelihood the sign would be recalled later on.  Id.  Thus, mentioning an object that does 
exist will enhance the likelihood that a person will later tell you that he saw that object.  Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Mathis, 264 F.3d at 341 (explaining the "relation back" effect refers to 
the fact that "once a witness makes an identification, he or she will tend to stick with that 
initial choice at subsequent photographic arrays or lineups, even if it was erroneous"). 
 43. See, e.g., Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness 
Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817, 825 (1995) 
(listing a variety of factors which could potentially have an impact on the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification). 
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expert testimony, the confidence-accuracy correlation is relevant every time 
an eyewitness takes the stand. 
B.  A Closer Look at the Weak Correlation Between 
Confidence and Accuracy 
"Eyewitness testimony is likely to be believed by jurors, especially 
when it is offered with a high level of confidence, even though the accuracy 
of an eyewitness and the confidence of that witness may not be related to 
one another at all."44  Common intuition tells us that the more confident an 
eyewitness is in their testimony the more likely it is that the witness is 
accurate in their identification.  And in fact, jurors habitually accord more 
weight to a witness who testifies with confidence than to one who does 
not.45  However, in this area "intuition is belied by scientific research," 
which reveals that in actuality there is an extremely weak correlation 
between witness confidence and accuracy.46   
One court recently noted that the confidence-accuracy correlation is at 
best 25%, and this already weak correlation can easily drop to zero if 
combined with other factors such as a short duration of interaction or poor 
lighting at the identification scene, both of which weaken an 
identification.47  Beyond the initial weak correlation between confidence 
and accuracy, confidence is a poor predictor of accuracy because a 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979)). 
 45. See, e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 825 ("A major source of juror 
unreliability is reliance on witness confidence, a dubious indicator of eyewitness accuracy 
even when measured at the time an identification is made."); Sowders, 449 U.S. at 352 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that eyewitness identification evidence has a powerful 
impact on juries, especially when the witness is confident the defendant is the perpetrator); 
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 9, 19 (1979) (canvassing statistical and 
psychological evidence supporting her conclusion that an eyewitness identification is 
"overwhelmingly influential," particularly when the witness is confident that their 
identification is correct).  
 46. See United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d. 1207, 1218 (M.D. Ala. 2009) 
(describing the lack of correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy and stating 
that "[i]n an instance such as this, where intuition is belied by scientific research, testimony 
from an expert may be of great assistance to a jury"). 
 47. See United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 334 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the 
eyewitness expert in the case testified that "the correspondence between confidence and 
accuracy is, at best, about 25 percent," and that when conditions attending the recalled 
memories are poor, "the relation between confidence and [accurate] memory is zero"). 
THROUGH THE LENS OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULE 403 773 
witness’s confidence is very malleable.48  For example, the information a 
witness gains throughout the investigation of a crime, through depositions 
and pre-trial preparation, can significantly boost his or her confidence.49  
Thus a witness may have a much higher level of confidence when testifying 
at trial than at the time of the initial identification.50  This phenomenon 
makes complete sense intuitively.  Just like any presentation for work or 
school, a speaker feels much more confident and comfortable after hours of 
preparation and positive feedback from co-workers or family than the day 
the speaker received the assignment.  However, in the eyewitness 
identification context, unlike the average work presentation, it is not 
possible for time and preparation to increase the accuracy or knowledge of 
the witness.  Jurors often believe that they will be able to differentiate the 
genuine and authentic confidence from the manufactured.51  But this 
"confidence" has the same affect on jurors whether it is contrived and 
practiced or whether it is natural.52 
Another factor which contributes to confidence malleability and can 
affect a witness’s confidence level is known as the "feedback factor."53  
Studies show that witnesses who were told that another witness identified 
the same suspect were significantly more confident than witnesses who 
were given no feedback.54  Additionally, witnesses who were given 
negative feedback and told a co-witness did not identify the same suspect 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 830 ("Given that confidence, when 
measured immediately after the identification, is a modest predictor of accuracy, reductions 
in reliability may render it utterly useless as an indicator of the accuracy of a witness’s 
identification.").  Additionally, it was further noted that studies have revealed "witnesses 
who were questioned repeatedly grew more confident about the accuracy of details in their 
reports."  Id. at 827.  
 49. See id. at 827–30 ("These communications could have the unintended effects of 
increasing witness confidence, reducing the diagnosticity of any confidence statements made 
to the jury by the eyewitness, and elevating conviction rates."). 
 50. See id at 827–28 ("A simple instruction to rehearse the witnesses’ account, sample 
questions that might be asked by a cross-examiner, and warnings that the cross-examiner 
will look for inconsistencies in the testimony are sufficient to inflate the witnesses’ 
confidence in his or her memory."). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 827 ("[W]hen cross-examined, the briefed witnesses were significantly 
more confident about their identifications than were unbriefed witnesses and were believed 
more often by the jurors."). 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 829.  
 54. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 828–29 (noting that the study revealed the 
"highest confidence levels obtained from witnesses who believed their co-witness had 
identified the same individual").  
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were considerably less confident than those who were given no feedback.55  
This could occur at the police station if an officer gives an eyewitness this 
type of feedback after making their initial identification.56  Suddenly, an 
identification made by an initially hesitant and uncertain eyewitness 
becomes the "correct answer" in their mind and the witness’s confidence 
soars.  Even if effective police practices are able to prevent this type of 
feedback from occurring at the stationhouse, the witness is just as likely to 
get this type of feedback information from his attorney.57  The true danger 
of the "feedback factor" is how difficult it is to prevent because it can occur 
at any stage or level of litigation through many potential sources.58  
In summary, the weak confidence-accuracy correlation is clearly an 
area where the scientific research is not within the common knowledge of 
the jury, and thus the topic has become one of the most frequently testified 
about by eyewitness identification experts.59  This lack of correlation 
between confidence and accuracy is strong evidence of the serious need for 
eyewitness identification expert testimony in our nation’s courtrooms.  The 
confidence-accuracy correlation is not a topic within the ken of the average 
juror and can be relevant any time an eyewitness takes the stand.  Contrary 
to the current widespread belief that eyewitness expert testimony is a rare 
remedy, testimony on the confidence-accuracy correlation is always going 
to be helpful and informative to a jury.60  
The eyewitness in Julius Ruffin’s case stopped dead in her tracks when 
she saw Ruffin walk onto an elevator in the hospital where she worked.61  It 
was weeks after the initial rape and though she had been through dozens of 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See id. at 829 ("The lowest confidence levels were found among witnesses who 
were told that the co-witness had indicated that the perpetrator was not in the array and 
among witnesses who were initially told that the co-witness identified someone else.").  
 56. See, e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 829–30 (noting a concern that police 
and attorneys will have an incentive to manipulate their witnesses’ confidence). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at 830 ("It is perhaps just as likely, if not more likely, that witnesses are the 
recipients of information provided to them by other witnesses (who may have made their 
own identifications) and even the news media."). 
 59. See id. at 825 ("Research on the weak confidence accuracy relation is regarded as 
a reliable basis for expert testimony by 87% of the respondents and was the second most 
common issue about which experts had, in fact, testified.").  
 60. See supra Part IV.B (describing the Majority Approach’s current hostility towards 
eyewitness expert testimony). 
 61. See The Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project, Case Profile on Julius Ruffin, 
http://www.exonerate.org/case-profiles/julius-ruffin/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2011) (describing 
Julius Ruffin’s story and the events leading up to his wrongful incarceration) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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suspect photos, she had been unable to identify her perpetrator.62  But when 
she saw Julius Ruffin that day she was certain that he was her attacker.63  
The victim proclaimed this genuine certainty to the jury that found Ruffin 
guilty and sentenced an innocent man to life in prison.64  There is little to no 
correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy,65  but Julius 
Ruffin’s exoneration makes that seemingly simple statement much more 
powerful and shines a light on the importance of expert testimony.66 
C.  Alternatives to Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony? 
Many courts believe that expert testimony is not the only effective 
means of relaying the dangers of eyewitness testimony to the jury.  Most 
commonly, courts reason that jury instructions and cross-examination 
effectively highlight any reliability problems in an eyewitness’s 
testimony.67 
Cross-examination is thought to be an effective alternative to expert 
testimony because both are tools that emphasize the potential unreliability 
or lack of credibility of a particular eyewitness.68  However, as noted 
earlier, expert testimony on eyewitness identification does not simply assess 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See supra notes 47–48 (explaining the weak correlation between eyewitness 
confidence and accuracy).  
 66. In addition to highlighting the confidence-accuracy correlation, Julius Ruffin could 
have also benefited from expert testimony on the effects of cross-racial identification.  See 
supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining that cross-racial identifications are 
generally less reliable). The phenomenon of "double identification" would have also been 
relevant to Ruffin’s case.  The victim and Ruffin both worked in the same hospital and thus 
she may have seen him before and "remembered" his face but attached it to the wrong 
situation.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text (explaining that double identification is 
a problem in determining whether a memory derives from one of two or more possible 
visual exposures to a person).  
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting 
that cross-examination and jury instructions are common arguments against admitting expert 
testimony); see also e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 825 (noting expert testimony, 
judicial instructions, and cross-examination are the most commonly used tools to assist 
jurors in assessing evidence). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. McGinnis, 201 F. App’x 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2006) ("It 
goes without saying that cross-examination serves a critical function, enabling jurors to 
appreciate discrepancies in testimony."); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 
1999) ("[A]ny weaknesses in eyewitness identification testimony ordinarily can be exposed 
through careful cross-examination of the eyewitnesses."). 
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the credibility of a particular eyewitness.69  The complex psychological 
issues pertaining to perception and memory that contribute to the 
unreliability of eyewitness identifications cannot be adequately explained to 
a jury through cross-examination.70  Numerous studies reveal that cross-
examination is an ineffective means of informing jurors about eyewitness 
identification reliability issues.71  In particular, studies have shown cross-
examination is particularly ineffective at increasing juror sensitivity to the 
lack of correlation between witness confidence and accuracy.72  It is also 
important to emphasize the difference between the inherent unreliability of 
eyewitness identification generally and the credibility of an individual 
witness.  An eyewitness can be completely genuine and truly believe that he 
or she is making a correct identification and yet still be mistaken.  The 
victim and eyewitness in Julius Ruffin’s case is a perfect example of a 
genuine but mistaken eyewitness.  The credibility and character of a witness 
are distinct from the inherent memory and perception problems that can 
affect an eyewitness’s accuracy.  Thus, cross-examination is an ineffective 
alternative to eyewitness identification expert testimony.  
Additionally, jury instructions are an unacceptable alternative to 
eyewitness expert testimony.  Research indicates that jury instructions are 
not effective at "integrating awareness" of the reliability problems with 
eyewitness testimony or at increasing general skepticism to eyewitness 
testimony.73  In particular, jury instructions do not effectively desensitize 
the jurors to the weak confidence-accuracy correlation.74  This was found to 
be true regardless of the timing of the jury instructions.75  Jury instructions 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 70. Supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 71. See, e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 819–20 (noting a study concluded that 
cross-examination of a witness by an experienced attorney did not aid the jury in 
determining accurate from inaccurate witnesses). 
 72. Id.  
 73. See, e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 834 (noting that because jurors often 
find jury instructions so confusing, the instructions actually have the adverse effect of 
decreasing juror sensitivity to eyewitness reliability issues);  see also e.g., Ferensic v. 
Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 481 (6th Cir. 2007) ("We agree with the district court that ‘other 
means’ of attacking eyewitness identifications do not effectively substitute for expert 
testimony on their inherent unreliability."). 
 74. See supra Part II.B (describing the weak correlation between eyewitness 
confidence and accuracy); see also e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 833 (surmising 
that the results of their study indicated that the jury instruction did not enhance skepticism or 
sensitization and did not desensitize jurors to witness confidence). 
 75. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 833–34 (explaining that when the jury was 
given the instructions did not make a significant difference on the overall effectiveness). 
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are equally ineffective whether given right before the eyewitness takes the 
stand or at the conclusion of the trial.76  Thus, when jury instructions are not 
combined with testimony from an eyewitness expert, the instructions do not 
provide an effective safeguard against mistaken identification.   
In summary, both cross examination and judicial instructions to the 
jury are ineffective mechanisms for informing the jury about eyewitness 
identification reliability issues.  Thus, this Note concludes that the 
"alternatives" to eyewitness identification expert testimony currently used 
in courtrooms across the country are unacceptable solutions and do not 
combat the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identifications.77  
III.  Federal Evidence Rule 403 
A.  Overview—History and Purpose 
Federal Evidence Rule 40378 is meant to be a liberal rule which does 
not allow exclusion of evidence if the evils of its admission are equal to its 
probative value or even if they just slightly outweigh the probative value.  
Federal Evidence Rule 403 states:  "Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."79  It is important to first note that Rule 403 allows for 
exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence.80  Exclusion under Rule 403 
requires the trial judge to find on balance that the probative81 value of the 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. To date, no court has held that eyewitness identifications are per se inadmissible, 
and this Note does not argue for a per se exclusion of eyewitness testimony.  Despite the 
inherent unreliability of eyewitness identifications, identifications are sometimes correct. 
Procedural fairness to the victim requires the justice system respect the right of the 
eyewitness to testify if the testimony passes the necessary evidence relevance rules.  
However, juror education and the admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony is 
a necessary and essential component to eyewitness testimony.  
 78. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at advisory committee’s note ("[C]ertain circumstances call for the 
exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned relevance.").  
 81. "‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401 (stating that evidence is 
"probative" if it has some tendency to make a fact more or less probable). "A brick is not a 
wall" and evidence will be probative if it contributes just one brick to the wall of proof built 
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evidence is "substantially outweighed."82  Additionally, Rule 403 only 
allows exclusion of evidence which is "unfairly" prejudicial; evidence 
which is merely prejudicial will not be sufficient.83  
Courts reviewing the legislative history of Federal Evidence Rule 403 
have concluded that the evidence rule offers an "extraordinary remedy [to 
be used] sparingly."84  Congress intended that judges would invoke this 
"drastic remedy" infrequently and only when absolutely necessary.85  This 
rule places the trial judge in a "gatekeeper" role and grants judges an 
incredible amount of discretion.86  The congressional debates over the 
proposed federal rules of evidence reveal that many in Congress and the 
practicing bar were concerned that Federal Evidence Rule 403 granted 
judges too much discretion and undue power.87  To pacify some of the 
opposition to Rule 403, Congress attempted to structure the language to 
grant judges "structured discretion."88  Unlike many other Federal Evidence 
                                                                                                                 
by a party. Id. at advisory committee’s note (quoting McCormick § 152).  
 82. FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added). 
 83. See id. at advisory committee’s note ( "‘Unfair prejudice’ within its context means 
an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not 
necessarily, an emotional one.").  
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Dodds, 347 F.3d 893, 897 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that 
Rule 403 is "‘an extraordinary remedy which the district court should invoke sparingly,’ and 
‘[t]he balance . . . should be struck in favor of admissibility’" (quoting United States v. 
Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 784 (11th Cir. 1989))). 
 85. See Edward Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403:  Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of 
Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 906 (1998) (noting Congress’s purpose in enacting Rule 
403 and arguing the rule should be interpreted narrowly so as not to improperly resurrect the 
common law rules of evidence).  
 86. See id. at 905 ("The concept of prejudice permits a judge to safeguard the integrity 
of the fact-finding process.").  It is the judge’s role under Rule 403 to protect the "integrity 
of the fact-finding process."  Id. at 894.  
 87. See C. Wright & K. Graham, Statutory History:  Rule 403, 22 FED. PRAC. & PROC. 
EVID. § 5211 (1st ed. 2009) ("The concept of mandatory exclusion for prejudice was taken 
from a New Jersey proposal and was apparently intended to mollify critics who had attacked 
earlier reform proposals for an excessive use of discretion.").  "During Congressional 
consideration, Rule 403 was labeled ‘controversial.’"  Id.; see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 1 
WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE:  COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 403–13 (Bender 1975) (describing the motivation for the original 
Rule 403; a commentary by Judge Weinstein, a member of the Advisory Committee).  
 88. Wright & Graham, supra note 87, at §5211; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 85, 
at 893–94 ("[R]ule 403 lists several factors that a judge may balance against the probative 
value of the evidence. Unlike many lists in article IV of the Federal Rules, the list in rule 403 
does not begin with the language, ‘such as.’  On its face, the list purports to be exhaustive."). 
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Rules, Rule 403 sets out an exhaustive list of factors with which the judge 
can balance against the probative value of the evidence.89  
The legislative history of Federal Evidence Rule 403 reveals that 
Congress clearly attempted to have the language limit a judge’s 
discretionary power by prescribing a list of factors and a balancing 
procedure which must be conducted.  However, the reality is that a trial 
judge’s decision to exclude evidence under Federal Evidence Rule 403 is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion and is very rarely reversed.90  Although 
courts recognize that Rule 403 offers a remedy to be used "sparingly," it 
continues to be a frequently used tool for the exclusion of eyewitness 
identification expert testimony in a majority of the federal circuits.91  The 
appellate courts have been using the grant of discretion under Rule 403 as a 
"magic elixir to resolve all issues of admissibility."92 
B.  "Cocktail Rulings"—Rule 403, Rule 702 and the Daubert Standard 
In the context of eyewitness identification expert testimony 
admissibility, it is important to understand how Federal Evidence Rule 403 
interacts with the other evidence rules governing the admissibility of expert 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note ("The rule does not 
enumerate surprise as a ground for exclusion . . . .").  Thus since the text omits any mention 
of surprise, the "judge cannot consider surprise in the rule 403 balancing process.  That 
statement would be a non sequitur unless the list in rule 403 is exclusive."  Imwinkelried, 
supra note 85, at 893–94.  
 90. Abuse of discretion review can act as "a virtual shield from reversal." ROGER PARK 
ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW § 12.01, 540–41 & n.6 (1998); see also e.g., U.S. v. Dodds, 347 F.3d 
893, 897 (2003) ("This Court reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings for a clear abuse 
of discretion."); Wright & Graham, supra note 87, at § 5211 ("[A]ny grant of discretion 
carries with it a limited immunity from appellate review.  That is, the trial judge will be 
reversed only where he has abused his discretion or refused to exercise it.").  But see Old 
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (holding that the admission of a prior conviction 
was unfairly prejudicial and it was an abuse of discretion under Rule 403 for the trial court 
to admit testimony regarding the conviction when the defendant had agreed to a stipulation); 
United States v. Cooper, 591 F.3d 582, 589–90 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that it was an abuse 
of discretion for a trial judge to omit a Rule 403 balancing analysis altogether when an 
objection was made by the defendant).  
 91. See infra Part IV.B and Part IV.E.2 (describing the majority approach and their 
treatment of Federal Evidence Rule 403). 
 92. See Wright & Graham, supra note 87 ("Seldom have the appellate courts insisted 
on the careful balancing envisaged by Rule 403; instead, they rely on a sloppy, free-floating 
conception of discretion as a magic elixir to resolve all issues of admissibility."). 
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testimony.  Federal Evidence Rule 70293 governs the admissibility of expert 
testimony in the federal courts.  Rule 702 provides:  
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, 
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of 
the case.94 
Additionally, Rule 702 provides that an expert witness must be properly 
qualified, must testify about a topic that is beyond the ken of the average 
juror, must have an adequate factual basis for her opinion, and the expert’s 
testimony must be the product of relevant and reliable methods.95  In 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,96 the Supreme Court directed the 
lower courts to conduct a two-step test in determining the admissibility of 
expert testimony.  First, the court must determine whether the expert’s 
testimony reflects valid and reliable "scientific knowledge" and "whether 
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in 
issue."97  Second, the court moves on to the "fit" prong and must ask 
whether the testimony is relevant to the task at hand and whether it will 
serve to aid the trier of fact.98  A common argument for exclusion of 
eyewitness identification expert testimony in the federal courts is that it 
would not be of assistance to the jury because the information is within the 
"ordinary knowledge of most lay jurors" and thus would not satisfy Rule 
702 or the "fit" prong of Daubert.99 
                                                                                                                 
 93. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (articulating a 
two-step test that trial courts must use in determining whether evidence and expert testimony 
is admissible).  
 97. Id. at 592–94 (noting a court should address "whether the theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review and publication," and whether it has achieved general 
acceptance in the particular scientific community).  
 98. Id.  
 99. See, e.g., infra Part IV.D (explaining that the Eleventh Circuit has determined that 
eyewitness expert testimony is per se inadmissible in large part because the jury can weigh 
the issues through common-sense evaluation); see also United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 
1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding "that a district court does not abuse it [sic] discretion in 
excluding such testimony.").  
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It is important to understand the exclusion analysis frequently 
proffered under Rule 702 and Daubert because those arguments often 
overlap with the arguments given under Rule 403.  For example, a court 
may find that eyewitness expert testimony is within the ken of the average 
juror and thus will not assist the juror under Rule 702.  As a consequence, 
any expert testimony allowed in would "usurp the role of the jury" and 
would also be unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.  I refer to this common 
overlapping analysis as "cocktail rulings."100  The analysis is muddled 
further by the fact that the courts regularly cite both Rule 702 and 403 for 
the decision to exclude, often without specifically enumerating a separate 
analysis under each rule.101  The appellate courts are then left to parse vague 
records, often assuming an acceptable reason for exclusion and then 
avoiding any further problem by deferring to the trials court’s discretion.  
This has created enormous inconsistency in the federal courts.  Not only are 
the federal courts split in how they treat eyewitness expert testimony 
generally and the amount of deference they are willing to grant,102 but 
deferral to these "cocktail rulings" allows conflicting decisions and 
reasoning in the lower courts to stand.  We are left with an unpredictable, 
standardless deferral to the trial judge’s discretion that has created a deep 
dissension among the lower courts regarding how eyewitness expert 
testimony should be treated.  Thus, an exclusion of eyewitness 
identification expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403 is often 
intertwined with Rule 702 and the Daubert analysis, and it is important to 
highlight their relationship.103  
                                                                                                                 
 100. The federal courts often exclude eyewitness expert testimony under multiple rules 
(702, 703, 704 and 403 for example) with the exclusion analysis under each thrown together 
like different types of alcohol in a cocktail. 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 313–18 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting 
the district court held the expert testimony was within the jurors’ "common knowledge" 
under Federal Evidence Rule 702 and would cause "delay" under Federal Evidence Rule 
403); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1050–51 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the district 
court excluded the expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 702 because the testimony 
would not be helpful for the jury, which was "generally aware of the problems with 
identification" and because the testimony would be unduly confusing and a waste of time 
under Federal Evidence Rule 403).  
 102. See infra Part IV (describing the current federal circuit court split). 
 103. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that 
when district courts fail to explain their rulings under Rule 403, "we are able to perform this 
balancing here" but some cases may require a remand or new trial).  But see United States v. 
Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing a district court’s decision to exclude 
eyewitness testimony based on Rules 403 and 702 and noting that the district court’s 
reasoning under Rule 403 was too conclusory). 
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C.  The Specialized Relevance Rules 
It is also important to understand the specialized relevance rules and 
how they relate to Federal Evidence Rule 403.  A specialized relevance rule 
reflects Congress’s judgment that, as a matter of law, the evidence it 
governs fails a Federal Evidence Rule 403 balancing test.104  The five 
specialized relevance rules deal with evidence of low probative power.105  
For example, Federal Evidence Rule 411 declares evidence that one party 
has liability insurance is not admissible to show "the person acted 
negligently or otherwise wrongfully."106  The specialized relevance rules 
not only reflect a congressional declaration of the relevancy of particular 
evidence, but they also reflect public policy concerns.107  In the case of Rule 
411, exclusion of liability insurance information encourages people to get 
insurance and avoids a windfall for the opponent of an insured party.108  
Most of the specialized relevance rules share a similar structure and 
prohibit only certain uses of the evidence they govern but permit all other 
uses.109  However, Rule 410 is different in that it prohibits guilty plea 
evidence for all purposes and specifies only two circumstances where 
admissibility is proper.110 
Specialized relevance rules are significant because they are 
congressional determinations that in certain situations the courts do not 
have discretion to conduct a balancing test under Federal Evidence Rule 
403.  In limited situations Congress has found a legislative solution 
necessary to cure important public policy issues with regard to relevance 
and Rule 403.  The structure of the specialized relevance rule is a potential 
solution for the massive problem with eyewitness identification expert 
testimony admissibility.111  It may be time for public policy and procedural 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Federal Evidence Rules 407–11 are known as the "specialized relevance rules." 
See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.11 at 183 n.8 (3d. ed. 2003) (describing 
the specialized relevance rules). 
 105. Id.  
 106. FED. R. EVID. 411. 
 107. See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104; GEORGE FISHER, 
EVIDENCE 90–92 (2d ed. 2008).  
 108. See FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee notes ("Knowledge of the presence or 
absence of liability insurance would induce juries to decide cases on improper grounds.").  
 109. FED. R. EVID. 407–09 and 411; supra note 107 and accompanying text.  
 110. FED. R. EVID. 410. 
 111. See infra Part V.A (describing a specialized relevance rule that could serve as a 
potential solution for eyewitness identification expert testimony admissibility).  
THROUGH THE LENS OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULE 403 783 
justice to limit judicial discretion to exclude eyewitness expert testimony 
under Federal Evidence Rule 403.112  
D.  Summary of Federal Evidence Rule 403 
As summarized above, Federal Evidence Rule 403 is a powerful tool 
which grants trial judges a tremendous amount of discretion.  An 
examination of the legislative history and purpose behind Rule 403 revealed 
that the rule was intended to be used "sparingly" to combat only extreme 
evils that substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.113  
However, the limited appellate review for Rule 403 exclusions has in many 
ways nullified any parameters which Congress may have intended to place 
on judicial discretion.114  In the context of this Note, this gap between the 
purpose of the rule and the reality of how it is exercised is significant when 
research reveals that Rule 403 is one of the most commonly cited sources 
for the exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony.115 
IV.  Circuit Split 
As noted in Part III,  Federal Evidence Rule 403 states that "[a]lthough 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."116  Thus, it is within the trial 
court’s discretion to exclude otherwise relevant and admissible expert 
testimony.117  Rule 403 allows trial judges to exclude the expert testimony 
if the probative value is outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury, 
delaying the trial, or causing unfair prejudice.118 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. 
 113. See supra notes 84, 86 and accompanying text (examining the legislative history 
behind Rule 403). 
 114. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting that a trial judge’s decision is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion under Rule 403 and is rarely reversed). 
 115. See infra Part IV.E (examining the current federal circuit split in the admission of 
eyewitness identification expert testimony). 
 116. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 117. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 118. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note ("Situations in this area call for 
balancing the probative value of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result 
from its admission."). 
784 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 765 (2011) 
Due to this large grant of judicial discretion, the circuits have split on 
whether the admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony can 
violate Rule 403.119  The majority of circuits have held that eyewitness 
identification expert testimony should not be admissible under Federal 
Evidence Rule 403.120  These circuits reason that the expert testimony might 
usurp the jury’s role of determining witness credibility, thus causing jurors 
to be confused and misled as to their roles as the finders of fact.121  The 
Third and Sixth Circuits, referred to in this Note as the Progressive 
Minority, have ruled that eyewitness identification expert testimony 
comports with Rule 403.122  These circuits explain that as long as the 
experts employ "reliable scientific expertise" to pertinent aspects of the 
human mind and body, the experts should be "welcomed" by the federal 
courts.123  
A.  Overview 
The treatment of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification 
by the federal circuit courts has experienced dramatic changes over the last 
thirty years and is still evolving today.124  In the 1970s and early 1980s, 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1219–20 (M.D. Ala. 2009) 
(noting a circuit split regarding whether eyewitness-identification expert testimony violates 
Federal Evidence Rule 403).  
 120. See United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding a district 
court was within its discretion to exclude an expert who "would effectively have inserted his 
own view of the officer’s credibility for that of the jurors, thereby usurping their role"); see 
also United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying a deferential standard 
to conclude that "the district court properly recognized the very real danger that the proffered 
expert testimony could either confuse the jury or cause it to substitute the expert’s credibility 
assessment for its own"); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992) 
("[T]he district court’s decision to exclude Dr. Loftus’ testimony was a proper exercise of its 
discretion, whether under Rule 702 or Rule 403."). 
 121. Supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 122. See United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing a 
district court’s decision to exclude eyewitness testimony based on Rules 403 and 702); see 
also United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984) (concluding that a trial 
court erred in excluding an eyewitness-identification expert under Rule 403); United States 
v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 316 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that eyewitness-identification expert 
testimony did not violate Rule 403’s prohibition against evidence that invites unjustified 
"delay"). 
 123. See, e.g., Mathis, 264 F.3d at 340 ("[E]xperts who apply reliable scientific 
expertise to juridically pertinent aspects of the human mind and body should generally, 
absent explicable reasons to the contrary, be welcomed by federal courts, not turned away."). 
 124. See, e.g., Smithers, 212 F.3d at 311 (noting that the treatment of eyewitness 
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courts were uniformly resistant towards eyewitness experts.125  The 
concerns commonly noted by the federal courts included the view that the 
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification were within the common 
knowledge of the jury,126 such expert testimony did not possess general 
acceptance in the scientific community,127 any weaknesses in an 
eyewitnesses’ identification could be revealed effectively through cross-
examination,128 and the admission of eyewitness expert testimony would be 
unduly prejudicial.129  Though most of the above concerns still have a 
strong presence in the courts today, in the mid to late 1980s there was a 
strong shift towards acknowledging the scientific validity of eyewitness 
expert testimony and the study of the psychological factors which influence 
the memory process.130 
Today, a majority of the federal circuits take a "discretionary 
approach"131 and defer to district courts’ decisions on whether to admit 
                                                                                                                 
identification expert testimony has experienced changes that coincide with the growth in 
modern scientific studies that highlight the problems with eyewitness identification); United 
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Judicial resistance to the 
introduction of this kind of expert testimony is understandable given its innovativeness and 
the fear of trial delay spawned by the spectre of the creation of a cottage industry of forensic 
psychologists."). 
 125. See, e.g., Smithers, 212 F.3d at 311 (explaining that defense attorneys began to 
bring expert eyewitness testimony into the courtroom in the early 1970s but that the courts 
were still very skeptical about admitting such testimony); United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 
532, 534 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that "[u]ntil fairly recently, most, if not all, courts excluded 
expert psychological testimony on the validity of eyewitness identification").  
 126. See, e.g., United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that 
the question is within the expertise of jurors).  
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding no 
general acceptance in the scientific community).  
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982) (reasoning 
that the eyewitness identification was adequately addressed through cross-examination); 
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that the district court 
did not err in excluding expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification because cross-
examination was sufficient to reveal any weaknesses in the identifications). 
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (ruling that the 
testimony would be prejudicial).  
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding 
that "[i]n a case in which the sole testimony is casual eyewitness identification, expert 
testimony regarding the accuracy of that identification is admissible and properly may be 
encouraged "); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985) (reasoning 
that "expert testimony on eyewitness perception and memory [should] be admitted at least in 
some circumstances"); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The 
day may have arrived, therefore, when Dr. Fulero’s testimony can be said to conform to a 
generally accepted explanatory theory."). 
 131. See McMullen v. State, 714 So.2d 368, 370–71 (Fla. 1998) (dividing the various 
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expert testimony on eyewitness identification.132  However, within this 
general majority model of respecting the discretion of the lower courts, 
some circuits clearly tend to favor or disfavor the admittance of eyewitness 
expert testimony.  The approaches currently taken by the circuit courts can 
be grouped into three categories.133  First, there is the majority approach 
which tends to favor or presume exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony 
in all but the most "narrow" of circumstances.134  Second, a small group of 
                                                                                                                 
jurisdictional approaches on this issue into categories, "discretionary" and "prohibitory," and 
explaining that the discretionary approach is the majority view on both the federal and state 
level).  The Florida Supreme Court described the discretionary approach as granting trial 
court discretion as to whether to admit such testimony.  Id. at 370.  
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d 55, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2006) 
("[W]e have consistently maintained that the admission of such testimony is a matter of 
case-by-case discretion and have refused to adopt such a blanket rule for its admission or 
exclusion."); United States v. Martin, 391 F.3d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 2004) (reviewing the 
lower court’s exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony for abuse of discretion); United 
States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 288–89 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A decision to exclude expert 
testimony rests soundly with the discretion of the trial court and shall be sustained unless 
‘manifestly erroneous.’"); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104–06 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(finding that the district court’s preclusion of the eyewitness expert evidence was a proper 
exercise of discretion whether under Rule 702 or 403); United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 
1046, 1052–54 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding the district court did not abuse their discretion in 
refusing to admit the expert testimony); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 
1994) ("Given the powerful nature of expert testimony, coupled with its potential to mislead 
the jury, we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that the proffered evidence 
would not assist the trier of fact and that it was likely to mislead the jury."); United States v. 
Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534–35 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court’s exclusion of 
eyewitness identification expert testimony and noting that most circuits eschew a per se rule 
about admissibility for a discretionary approach); but see United States v. Brownlee, 454 
F.3d 131, 141–44 (3d Cir. 2006) (reversing the district court for abuse of discretion in 
refusing to allow eyewitness expert testimony). 
 133. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d. 1207, 1219–20 (M.D. Ala. 
2009) (noting a circuit split regarding whether eyewitness-identification expert testimony 
violates Federal Evidence Rule 403); McMullen, 714 So. 2d at 370–71 (describing the 
federal circuit court split and grouping the circuit’s approaches in terms of "discretionary" or 
"prohibitory").  
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 906–07 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming the exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony because there were multiple 
witnesses who identified the defendant and some of the witnesses knew the defendant well 
and were not strangers to him); United States v. Villiard, 186 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(finding no abuse of discretion in denying expert eyewitness identification testimony 
because the government’s case did not rest exclusively on uncorroborated eyewitness 
testimony); United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1053–54 (10th Cir. 1998) (refusing to 
find "narrow circumstances" existed for there were five eyewitnesses and not just one); 
United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 535 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The narrow circumstances held 
sufficient to support the introduction of expert testimony have varied but have included such 
problems as cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after 
observation under stress, and [such] psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and 
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circuits takes a more progressive approach and generally favors admission 
and recognizes the importance of eyewitness identification expert 
testimony.135  Third, the Eleventh Circuit is the last remaining circuit to 
mandate a per se rule of exclusion for eyewitness identification expert 
testimony.136 
B.  The Majority Approach 
The Majority Approach contains almost all of the circuits and 
routinely excludes expert testimony on eyewitness identification.137  These 
circuits have recently begun to accept the scientific validity of eyewitness 
identification experts and the importance of admitting expert testimony in 
certain limited circumstances.138  However, most of the circuits taking the 
Majority Approach still generally disfavor admission and narrowly define 
the situations where admission may be necessary.139  For example, the 
                                                                                                                 
unconscious transference."). 
 135. See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2001) (examining 
an eyewitness expert’s methods and "welcom[ing]" such testimony); United States v. 
Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311–18 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that a district court erred in not 
admitting eyewitness-identification expert testimony); Moore, 786 F.2d at 1313 (5th Cir. 
1986) (finding that, under some circumstances, eyewitness-identification expert testimony 
"properly may be encouraged"); Smith, 736 F.2d at 1107 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The day may have 
arrived, therefore, when Dr. Fulero’s testimony can be said to conform to a generally 
accepted explanatory theory."). 
 136.  See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that "a 
district court does not abuse its discretion when it excludes expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification"); see also United States v. Holloway, 971 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(describing the "established rule" of the Eleventh Circuit that eyewitness identification 
expert testimony was not admissible); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315 (11th 
Cir. 1984) ("[Defendant’s] contention that the district court incorrectly excluded expert 
testimony concerning identification also lacks merit because such testimony is not 
admissible in this circuit.").  But see Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d. at 1214 (questioning the 
Eleventh Circuit’s per se exclusion rule and noting that "[n]either Smith nor Thevis 
addressed . . . whether a district court abuses its discretion by admitting this evidence 
pursuant to the analysis required by Rule 702 and Daubert").  
 137. For purposes of this analysis I have included the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in this grouping.  
 138. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (listing cases that have acknowledged 
"narrow circumstances" where admissibility would be necessary but nevertheless 
distinguished their factual situation and excluded the expert testimony).  
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104 (7th Cir. 1999) ("This Court 
has a long line of cases which reflect our disfavor of expert testimony on the reliability of 
eyewitness identification."); United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 885 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating 
that the Eighth Circuit is "especially hesitant to find an abuse of discretion" in denying 
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Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Harris,140 defined "narrow 
circumstances" as including "such problems as cross-racial identification, 
identification after a long delay, identification after observation under 
stress, and psychological phenomena such as the feedback factor and 
unconscious transference."141  However, the court’s application of this 
definition to the facts at hand illuminates the tendency of the circuits in this 
group to distinguish their cases from the "narrow circumstance" if at all 
possible.  Harris dealt with a bank robbery and three bank employees who 
served as witnesses identifying the defendant.142  The defendant admitted he 
was in the bank earlier that day, and thus the witnesses were testifying both 
that they saw the defendant earlier that day and that he robbed the bank.143  
The defendant argued that the expert’s testimony regarding cross-racial 
identifications144 and memory in stressful situations would be particularly 
relevant; however, the court did not find the argument persuasive.  The 
court stated that since one of the three eyewitnesses was also African-
American, the cross-racial identification issue was effectively eliminated 
for the other two Caucasian witnesses.145  The court also stated that because 
the eyewitnesses claimed to have seen the defendant in the bank earlier that 
day, the stress factor of the identification during the later bank robbery was 
no longer an issue.146  Lastly, the court used a common theory147 for 
                                                                                                                 
eyewitness expert testimony); United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(noting eyewitness expert testimony is generally inadmissible except when the case depends 
primarily on eyewitness identification). 
 140. See United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534–36 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming the 
exclusion of expert testimony by the district court and noting that except under narrow 
circumstances "[t]his type of evidence, almost by definition, can be of no assistance to a 
jury"). 
 141. Id. at 535. 
 142. Id. at 533. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See supra note 38 (summarizing scientific findings in the area of cross-racial 
identifications).  
 145. See Harris, 995 F.2d at 536 ("Race did not play a role in these identifications—
while Harris is black, Watkins is also black, and her testimony was almost identical to that of 
Dean and White.").  
 146. See id. ("All of these identifications happened over five to twenty minute intervals, 
and none occurred under circumstances that could be deemed stressful, except Dean’s 
confrontation with the robber." (emphasis added)). 
 147. See also, e.g., United States v. McGinnis, 201 F. App’x 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2006) 
("It goes without saying that cross-examination serves a critical function, enabling jurors to 
appreciate discrepancies in testimony."); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 
1999) ("[A]ny weaknesses in eyewitness identification testimony ordinarily can be exposed 
through careful cross-examination of the eyewitnesses."). 
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keeping eyewitness expert testimony out stating that "any discrepancies in 
these testimonies were brought out or could have been brought out on 
cross-examination."148  
The Majority Approach commonly denies the admission of eyewitness 
expert testimony if there is any corroborating evidence other than the 
eyewitness identification.  For example, the Seventh Circuit stated that 
"[g]enerally speaking, the existence of corroborating evidence undercuts the 
need, except in the most compelling cases, for expert testimony on 
eyewitness identifications."149  The Fifth Circuit also takes a strong position 
and notes that except "in a case in which the sole testimony is casual 
eyewitness identification," expert testimony regarding the accuracy of that 
identification is not to be encouraged.150  Additionally, the Eighth Circuit is 
"especially hesitant" to admit eyewitness expert testimony unless the case 
rests "exclusively on uncorroborated eyewitness testimony."151  The above 
examples demonstrate that the admission of eyewitness identification expert 
testimony is easy to avoid if circuits take an extreme position on when an 
eyewitness identification expert will be needed.  
In summary, the majority of circuits generally do not allow eyewitness 
expert testimony unless the entire case against the defendant rests solely on 
an uncorroborated eyewitness.  These circuits tend to avoid and disfavor 
eyewitness expert testimony for fear that admittance will accomplish 
nothing other "than to muddy the waters."152  In the case of Julius Ruffin, 
eyewitness expert testimony would have almost certainly been excluded 
under the Majority Approach.  Although the victim was the only eyewitness 
to testify at trial, there was additional corroborating DNA evidence.153  The 
scientific testing performed on the semen sample displayed that only 8% of 
all African-American men could be a potential match, and Ruffin was in 
that limited group.154  Under the Majority Approach, this limited 
corroborating evidence would have been sufficient to differentiate the 
                                                                                                                 
 148.  United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 536 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 149. Hall, 165 F.3d at 1107 (emphasis added).  
 150. McGinnis, 201 F. App’x at 249 (emphasis added). 
 151. See United States v. Villiard, 186 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) 
(finding no abuse of discretion in denying expert eyewitness identification testimony 
because the government’s case did not rest exclusively on uncorroborated eyewitness 
testimony).  
 152. See United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that the 
eyewitness identification expert testimony would do nothing other than "muddy the waters"). 
 153. Supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 154. Id. 
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"narrow circumstances" where eyewitness expert testimony must be 
respected. 
C.  The Progressive Minority 
The Progressive Minority, consisting of the Third and the Sixth 
Circuits, leads the way in recognizing the potential value in eyewitness 
identification expert testimony.  The progressive approach of these circuits 
is exemplified by their refusal to accept many of the common reasonings 
given by the other circuits as a basis for rejection.  In United States v. 
Downing,155 the Sixth Circuit addressed several lines of reasoning given by 
other courts in the past for exclusion of eyewitness identification expert 
testimony.  The Court found the notions of cross-examination, common 
sense, usurping the role of the jury, and undue confusion to be unpersuasive 
arguments for exclusion.156  The Court disavowed skepticism towards 
eyewitness expert testimony as a matter of principal and stated that, rather, 
the "admission depends upon the ‘fit,’ i.e., upon a specific proffer showing 
that scientific research has established that particular features of the 
eyewitness identifications involved may have impaired the accuracy of 
those identifications."157 The Downing case set the stage for the liberal view 
that the Third and Sixth Circuits would cultivate over the next twenty years.  
Recently, in United States v. Brownlee,158 the Third Circuit noted that 
expert testimony should have been admitted because "‘witnesses oftentimes 
profess considerable confidence in erroneous identifications,’ and expert 
testimony was the only method of imparting the knowledge concerning 
confidence-accuracy correlation to the jury."159  Brownlee reversed even a 
limited exclusion of expert testimony and recognized the importance of 
confidence-accuracy testimony when the defense rested on the reliability of 
the government’s four eyewitnesses.160  
                                                                                                                 
 155. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding "the 
liberal standard of admissibility mandated by Rule 702"). 
 156. See id. at 1229–30 ("We have serious doubts about whether the conclusion reached 
by these courts is consistent with the liberal standard of admissibility mandated by Rule 
702."). 
 157. Id. at 1226. 
 158. See United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that it 
was wrong to exclude expert testimony regarding the correlation between confidence and 
accuracy when the defense’s case rested on the reliability of the government’s witnesses).  
 159. Id.  
 160. See id. ("[W]e hold it was wrong to exclude expert testimony regarding the 
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The Sixth Circuit stated that expert testimony is important because 
eyewitness identification expert testimony "inform[s] the jury of why the 
eyewitnesses’ identifications were inherently unreliable" and, thus, provides 
a "scientific, professional perspective that no one else [can] offer to the 
jury."161  In the Sixth Circuit’s view, the significance of an expert’s 
testimony "cannot be overstated" because, without it, a jury has "no basis 
beyond defense counsel’s word to suspect the inherent unreliability" of an 
eyewitness identification.162  The inherent unreliability of eyewitness 
identifications is not common knowledge and thus it is the exact situation 
where expert testimony is needed.  As the court itself neatly stated in 
United States v. Smithers,163 there is an inherent "dichotomy between 
eyewitness errors and jurors’ reliance on eyewitness testimony, therefore 
this Circuit has held that expert testimony on the subject of eyewitness 
identification is admissible."164  Thus, the Progressive Minority recognizes 
the importance of eyewitness identification expert testimony and generally 
favors admission. 
In the case of Julius Ruffin, eyewitness identification expert testimony 
would have most likely been admitted under the Progressive Minority 
approach.165  Given that the government’s case rested almost entirely on 
one eyewitness identification, this is the exact circumstance where the 
Progressive Minority has found expert testimony to be important.  
However, it is important to emphasize that although the Progressive 
Minority tends to favor admission, it does not have a per se admissible 
approach.  Thus, Ruffin would not have been guaranteed eyewitness expert 
testimony.  If a lower court found the corroborating DNA evidence in 
Ruffin’s case to be sufficient to overcome the "narrow circumstances" 
described in Downing, there is a strong chance the appellate court would 
                                                                                                                 
reliability of the very eyewitness identification evidence on which Brownlee was convicted, 
and remand the case for a new trial.").  
 161. See Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 477–80 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
exclusion of the defense eyewitness identification expert impermissibly interfered with the 
defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense). 
 162. Id. at 482. 
 163. See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing the 
district court and holding that the district court should have conducted a hearing under 
Daubert and analyzed the evidence to determine whether the expert’s proffered testimony 
reflected scientific knowledge, and whether the testimony was relevant and would have 
aided the trier of fact).  
 164. Id. at 312.  
 165. See supra note 2 (describing the case against Julius Ruffin).  
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have deferred to the trial judge’s discretion.166  The Progressive Minority 
has made significant strides towards respecting eyewitness identification 
expert testimony; however, the trend remains unpredictable given the strong 
deference to trial courts’ decisions. 
D.  Per Se Inadmissible Approach 
The Eleventh Circuit stands alone in its approach and takes an extreme 
position against eyewitness identification expert testimony, holding that 
such testimony is per se inadmissible. In United States v. Holloway,167 the 
appellant argued that the refusal to admit eyewitness identification 
testimony was in error. The court dismissed the argument stating simply 
that "[t]he established rule of this circuit is that such testimony is not 
admissible."168  The Eleventh Circuit reasons that eyewitness identification 
expert testimony is merely "marginally relevant psychological evidence" 
and problems of perception and memory are more "adequately addressed in 
cross-examination" or "through common-sense evaluation."169  
Recently, in United States v. Smith,170 the defendant argued that the 
new standard announced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals171 
conflicted with the Eleventh Circuit’s per se inadmissibility approach.172  
                                                                                                                 
 166. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 167. See United States v. Holloway, 971 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the 
established rule of the Eleventh Circuit is to exclude eyewitness identification expert 
testimony).  
 168. Id. at 679; see also United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 
1984) (stating that the defendant’s "contention that the district court incorrectly excluded 
expert testimony concerning identification also lacks merit because such testimony is not 
admissible in this circuit"). 
 169. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982) (refusing to admit 
eyewitness identification expert testimony and stating that "[t]o admit such testimony in 
effect would permit the proponent’s witness to comment on the weight and credibility of 
opponents’ witnesses and open the door to a barrage of marginally relevant psychological 
evidence"). 
 170. See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming earlier 
precedent creating a per se rule of inadmissibility).  
 171. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) 
(articulating a two-step test that trial courts must use in determining whether evidence and 
expert testimony is admissible).  First, the court must determine whether the expert’s 
testimony reflects valid and reliable "scientific knowledge," and "whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."  Id. at 592–93.  Second, the court 
must ask whether the expert testimony is "fit."  For this the court must look at whether the 
testimony is relevant to the task at hand and whether it will serve to aid the trier of fact.  Id. 
 172. See Smith, 122 F.3d at 1358 ("Smith argues that Daubert ‘lower[ed] the standard 
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The court stated that it need not even address the argument because under 
Daubert, expert testimony that does not assist the finder of fact can be 
excluded.173  Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has evaded the issue of whether this 
per se inadmissibility rule really holds up under Daubert and instead merely 
confirmed that it is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find 
that eyewitness identification expert testimony is not admissible because it 
does not aid the jury in any way.174 
However, dissension is growing in the Eleventh Circuit, and the lower 
courts have recently attempted to address the unanswered issue about 
whether the per se rule of inadmissibility should remain in effect.  In United 
States v. Smith,175 the district court admitted eyewitness identification 
expert testimony.176  The court stated that it felt a "per se proscription 
against all eyewitness-identification expert testimony is irreconcilable with 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert."177  
Though recent district court cases out of the Eleventh Circuit have 
begun to question this hostile position, the per se exclusion rule and 
precedents finding no value in eyewitness expert testimony still remain the 
law and shape the approach taken in the Eleventh Circuit today.  In the case 
of Julius Ruffin,178 this antiquated approach would strip him of any chance 
to admit eyewitness expert testimony.  Ruffin’s case perfectly demonstrates 
the extreme dangers inherent in the Eleventh Circuit’s approach.  Without 
even the limited "narrow circumstances" respect given to eyewitness expert 
testimony by the Majority Approach,179 the Eleventh Circuit leaves an 
                                                                                                                 
for admissibility of expert evidence’ and thus opened the door for admitting expert 
testimony regarding eyewitness reliability."). 
 173. Id. at 1359. 
 174. See id. at 1359 ("Thevis held that expert testimony regarding eyewitness reliability 
does not assist the jury, and we conclude that that holding is in harmony with Daubert.  
Therefore, it is as true after Daubert as it was before that a district court does not abuse it 
discretion in excluding such testimony."). 
 175. See United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d. 1207, 1219–20 (M.D. Ala. 2009) 
(affirming the admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony at trial and rejecting 
the government’s motion to exclude). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. at 1211 (stating that Daubert "eschewed such categorical prohibitions of 
entire classes of expert conclusions; in determining whether to admit testimony, the Court 
stated, the focus ‘must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that 
they generate’" (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 595 
(1993))). 
 178. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the Julius Ruffin case). 
 179. See, e.g., supra Part IV.B (explaining that the majority approach recognizes that in 
certain narrow circumstances, particularly when eyewitness testimony is the sole evidence 
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innocent man with no safeguard against an eyewitness who points at him 
and says, "He is the one!" 
E.  The Circuit Split and Federal Evidence Rule 403 
Now that the general approaches currently taken in the federal circuit 
courts with regard to eyewitness identification expert testimony 
admissibility have been examined, this Note will delve into a closer 
examination regarding how the circuits are treating attempts to exclude 
eyewitness expert testimony using Federal Evidence Rule 403.  In 
particular, this section will highlight the differences between the 
Progressive Minority’s and the Majority Approach’s treatment of Federal 
Evidence Rule 403. 
1.  The Progressive Minority and Rule 403 
In United States v. Smithers180 the respondent argued that eyewitness 
identification expert testimony should not be admitted because it was within 
the common knowledge of the jury, it would invade the province of the 
jury, and admittance would cause "delay" under Federal Evidence Rule 
403.181  First, the district court stated that "a jury can fully understand" its 
"obligation to be somewhat skeptical of eyewitness testimony."182  The 
Sixth Circuit dismissed this argument as not only contrary to the scientific 
evidence showing jurors are "unduly receptive" rather than skeptical 
towards eyewitness testimony, but also because this reasoning would lead 
to a virtual per se exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony.183  
                                                                                                                 
against a defendant, expert testimony may be appropriate).  
 180. See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing the 
district court and holding that the district court should have conducted a hearing under 
Daubert and analyzed the evidence to determine whether the expert’s proffered testimony 
reflected scientific knowledge, and whether the testimony was relevant and would have 
aided the trier of fact). 
 181. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." (emphasis added)). 
 182. Smithers, 212 F.3d at 315.  
 183. See id. at 316 ("[A]ccepting the district court’s analysis that all jurors are aware of 
their obligation to be skeptical would lead to absurd results:  expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification would never be admissible."). 
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Second, the government argued that admittance of the testimony would 
have invaded the jury’s province.184  The court conceded that it would be 
inappropriate for an expert to testify as to what the witness did or did not 
see.185  However, the court stated that the "proper solution would have been 
to excise the inappropriate portion of the proffer rather than to exclude all 
of the testimony" because the general testimony regarding the perception 
and memory of eyewitnesses is "relevant and helpful to the jury."186  Third, 
the court addressed the argument that the expert testimony should be 
excluded under Federal Evidence Rule 403 because it would cause 
"delay."187  The Smithers court first noted that "‘in reviewing a 403 
balancing, the court must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its 
prejudicial effect.’"188  After noting that "delay" under Federal Evidence 
Rule 403 did not refer to the late submission of motions, the court further 
stated that it found no evidence indicating that the government did not have 
sufficient notice of the expert testimony.189  The Sixth Circuit stated that as 
a general proposition it is not appropriate to exclude important eyewitness 
identification testimony based on its "supposed tardiness."190  A defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to an effective defense should outweigh a discovery 
sanction.191  
                                                                                                                 
 184. Id. at 317 n.3.  The court dismissed the dissent’s attempt to bolster this argument 
by stating that cross-examination and jury instructions should be the tools to discredit 
eyewitness testimony.  Id at 316.  The court highlighted inconsistent procedural logic in this 
argument for the dissent did not sufficiently explain "why cross-examination and jury 
instructions can serve these goals for eyewitness testimony, but not for expert testimony."  
Id. at 316.  
 185. Id. at 317 n.3.  
 186. Id.  
 187. See id. at 316 (noting that "‘delay’ [in Rule 403] does not connote delay in the 
submission of motions or proffers; rather, it encompasses the prolonging of the length of the 
trial, and can be read properly in conjunction with the other exclusionary factors:  ‘waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence’"). 
 188. Id. at 313 (quoting United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
 189. See id. at 317 ("First, the Defendant filed his ten-page motion in limine requesting 
a ruling on this issue a full month before trial . . . .  Thus, it is impossible to say that either 
the court or the government did not have adequate notice of the issue."). 
 190. Id.  
 191. See id. ("‘The defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an effective defense will 
usually outweigh the interest served by pretrial discovery orders.’" (quoting United States v. 
Collins, No. 87-5077, 1988 WL 4434, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 25, 1988))).  
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United States v. Downing192 is a seminal case out of the Third Circuit 
that, at the time, marked a dramatic change in attitude towards eyewitness 
expert testimony, and it is a case that continues to define the Progressive 
Minority approach even today.  In Downing, the sole evidence against the 
defendant was eyewitness testimony and his sole defense was mistaken 
identity.193  The Downing court conducted a Federal Evidence Rule 403 
balancing test with regard to the eyewitness identification expert testimony.  
The court conceded that it was possible for eyewitness expert testimony to 
"mislead" or "confuse" the jury and noted that "[t]he danger that scientific 
evidence will mislead the jury might be greater, for example, where the jury 
is not presented with the data on which the expert relies, but must instead 
accept the expert’s assertions as to the accuracy of his conclusions."194  
However, the Third Circuit also emphasized the importance of eyewitness 
identification expert testimony, especially where the eyewitness evidence is 
the only evidence offered by the government.195  The court stated it would 
be illogical to hold that the admission of the expert testimony would so 
waste time or confuse the jury that it cannot be considered "even when its 
putative effect is to vitiate the only (eyewitness) evidence offered by the 
government."196  The court dismissed the fearful argument that these 
eyewitness experts will be asked to testify in every case with an eyewitness 
creating a "battle of the experts" problem which misleads the jury and 
creates a prejudicial effect.197  The court stated that the district court has 
discretion to limit the number of experts who can testify and the length of 
their testimony.198  However, the court stated that if the eyewitness 
testimony is highly probative, the parties are entitled to present the expert, 
regardless of whether it adds to the length of the trial.199  "[P]resumably 
such evidence will add clarity and enhance the truth-seeking function of the 
trial, thereby offsetting the disadvantage of delay."200 
                                                                                                                 
 192. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting "the 
liberal standard of admissibility mandated by Rule 702"). 
 193. Id. at 1244.  
 194. Id. at 1239.  
 195. See id. at 1243 ("The availability of Rule 403 is especially significant when there 
is evidence of a defendant’s guilt other than eyewitness evidence, e.g., fingerprints, or other 
physical evidence."). 
 196. Id. at 1243.  
 197. Id. at 1243 n.27. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
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In summary, the Progressive Minority will normally not tolerate 
exclusion of relevant eyewitness expert testimony under Federal Evidence 
Rule 403.  The Third and Sixth Circuits have begun to place limitations on 
and provide restrictive guidance for when and how courts should use 
Federal Evidence Rule 403 to exclude eyewitness identification expert 
testimony.  In the Sixth Circuit, an exclusion of eyewitness expert 
testimony based on the idea that the expert testimony usurps the role of the 
jury as fact-finder is an argument that is not accepted.201  The significant 
steps taken by the Progressive Minority towards limiting judicial discretion 
in the area of eyewitness expert testimony exclusion are very important.  By 
limiting judicial discretion to exclude eyewitness expert testimony under 
Rule 403, these progressive circuits are beginning to treat Rule 403 
exclusion as the "extreme remedy" it is intended to be.202  It is possible for a 
court to abuse its discretion when conducting a Rule 403 balancing test, and 
the Progressive Minority has begun to take a stand against the improper 
exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony.  
2.  The Majority Approach and Rule 403 
In direct contrast to the views of the Progressive Minority, many of the 
circuits in the Majority Approach believe that eyewitness expert testimony 
can often be excluded under Federal Evidence Rule 403 for causing undue 
confusion, wasting time, usurping the role of the jury, or being unduly 
prejudicial.203  These circuits stand firmly behind the claim that the 
balancing of prejudice and probative value under Rule 403 rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court.204  Thus, under the Majority Approach, a 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See, e.g., Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 480 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that 
the exclusion of the eyewitness identification expert testimony was not proper and denied 
the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense); United States v. Smithers, 
212 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that because of the existence of  a dichotomy 
between the inherent unreliability of eyewitnesses and jurors’ reliance on eyewitness 
testimony, this is the exact situation where expert testimony is needed). 
 202. See supra Part III.A (describing the legislative history and purpose of Federal 
Evidence Rule 403). 
 203. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051–52 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(affirming an exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony under Federal 
Evidence Rule 403 as unduly confusing and prejudicial to the jury); United States v. Serna, 
799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming an exclusion of eyewitness identification expert 
testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403). 
 204. See, e.g., United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[E]xclusion of 
expert testimony is a matter committed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial 
judge . . . ."); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) ("The balancing of 
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large amount of eyewitness identification expert testimony is excluded 
under this seemingly impenetrable blanket of Federal Evidence Rule 403. 
In United States v. Fosher,205 the government’s case rested almost 
entirely on two eyewitnesses who purported to see the defendant in the area 
of the crime at the time the bank robbery occurred.206  The trial court 
excluded the testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403 because the court 
feared the testimony would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice 
and confusion because of its "aura of special reliability and 
trustworthiness."207  The First Circuit affirmed this exclusion and added that 
the trial court has the discretion to "avoid imposing upon the parties the 
time and expense involved in a battle of experts."208 
United States v. Serna209 is another example of an appellate court 
deferring to the "broad grant of discretion" given to trial judges under Rule 
403 and excluding the eyewitness expert testimony.210  The court concluded 
that the proffered expert testimony would consist of nothing other than 
"general pronouncements about the lack of reliability of eyewitness 
identification" and noted that the expert knew nothing about the particular 
factual circumstances surrounding this particular identification.211  Thus, in 
                                                                                                                 
prejudice and probative value under FED. R. EVID. 403 rests with the sound discretion of the 
trial court."). 
 205. See Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383–84 (affirming the trial court’s exclusion of eyewitness 
expert testimony as a decision that is within the lower court’s "sound discretion").  
 206. Id. at 382. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 383–84.  Compare Fosher, 590 F.2d at 384 (stating that it is within the 
court’s discretion to avoid a battle of the experts), with United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 
1224, 1243 n.27 (3d Cir. 1985) (dismissing the "battle of the experts" concern and stating 
that highly probative expert testimony must be admitted regardless of the length it may add 
to the trial).  
 209. See United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming an 
exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403).  
 210. See id. at 850 ("A trial judge is accorded broad discretion in admitting or 
excluding expert testimony under FED. R. EVID. 702 and in excluding testimony under FED. 
R. EVID. 403 because of the danger of jury confusion or unfair prejudice.").  
 211. Id. at 850. Compare Serna, 799 F.2d at 850 (stating that a "general 
pronouncements about the lack of reliability of eyewitness identification" are not enough and 
specifically noting that the expert knew nothing about the specific circumstances of that 
particular identification), with United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 317 n.3 (6th Cir. 
2000) (stating that it would be inappropriate for an expert to testify as to what the witness 
did or did not see and that general testimony regarding the perception and memory of 
eyewitnesses is "relevant and helpful to the jury").  
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the Second Circuit’s opinion, eyewitness identification expert testimony 
would do nothing other than "muddy the waters."212  
Recently, in United States v. White,213 the Fourth Circuit affirmed an 
exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403 
because portions of the testimony were likely to confuse the jury, while 
other portions were within the common knowledge of the jury.214  
Specifically, the court rejected testimony concerning the lack of correlation 
between confidence and accuracy under Federal Evidence Rule 403 
because it could not be quantified and thus would be more likely to confuse 
the jury.215  
The Eighth Circuit has noted that Federal Evidence Rules 702 and 403 
provide for exclusion of "evidence which wastes time," such as "opinions 
which would merely tell the jury what result to reach."216 The court noted 
that because there is a "very real danger" that eyewitness identification 
expert testimony could confuse the jury or "cause it to substitute the 
expert’s credibility assessment for its own," it is often properly excluded 
under Federal Evidence Rule 403.217  
In summary, a majority of the circuit courts currently permit 
eyewitness expert testimony to be excluded under Federal Evidence Rule 
403.  Most of the circuits have no pattern or clear guidance for when or how 
Rule 403 should be used to exclude eyewitness expert testimony.  Thus, we 
are left with a plethora of contradictory holdings and a Majority Approach 
without a solid stance on how Federal Evidence Rule 403 should be used.  
The majority of circuits have placed no limitation on Rule 403 balancing 
with regard to the admission or exclusion of eyewitness identification 
expert testimony.  As a result, exclusion under Rule 403 has been permitted 
for undue confusion, waste of time, usurping the role of the jury, or for 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Serna, 799 F.2d at 850.  
 213. See United States v. White, 309 F. App’x 772, 775 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming an 
exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rules 702 
and 403).  
 214. See id. (noting that mug shot recognition effect appears to be within the scope of 
the jurors’ common knowledge). 
 215. See id. (noting additionally that the length of time the eyewitness was exposed to 
the defendant negated the confidence accuracy correlation).  
 216. See United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming an 
exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony).  
 217. See id. ("Given the powerful nature of expert testimony, coupled with its potential 
to mislead the jury, we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that the 
proffered evidence would not assist the trier of fact and that it was likely to mislead the 
jury."). 
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being unduly prejudicial.  The Majority Approach is in direct contrast with 
the original purpose of Rule 403 as a remedy to be used only "sparingly."218  
Eyewitness identification expert testimony should not be treated any 
differently than other types of expert testimony.  If the expert testimony 
meets the requirements of Rule 702, it should be routinely admitted in all 
but the most extreme circumstances.  However, a majority of the federal 
circuit courts are currently using Federal Evidence Rule 403 as a weapon to 
block the admission of essential eyewitness identification expert testimony. 
F.  Circuit Split Summary 
Currently, the Federal Circuit takes three distinct approaches regarding 
the admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony.  The majority 
of circuits routinely exclude expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification.219  The Third and the Sixth Circuits lead the Progressive 
Minority and generally recognize the potential value in eyewitness 
identification expert testimony.220  And last, the Eleventh Circuit continues 
to stand its ground and holds that as a rule, eyewitness identification expert 
testimony is inadmissible.221  
Federal Evidence Rule 403 has detrimentally contributed to the 
problem of eyewitness identification expert testimony exclusion in a 
majority of the federal circuit courts today.222  The limited purpose of Rule 
403 and its intended use as an "extreme" remedy have been abandoned.223  
Even the circuits that have attempted to place some limitations on the 
exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony continue to allow virtually 
unfettered discretion to exclude eyewitness expert testimony under Federal 
Evidence Rule 403.224  Given the limited appellate review and the lack of 
                                                                                                                 
 218. See supra Part III.A (describing Rule 403 as an "extreme" remedy to be used only 
"sparingly").  
 219. See supra Part IV.B (describing the "majority approach" of the federal circuits 
with regard to eyewitness identification admissibility).  
 220. See supra Part IV.C (describing the Progressive Minority and the approach of the 
Third and Sixth Circuits).  
 221. See supra Part IV.D (describing the per se inadmissibility approach of the 
Eleventh Circuit).  
 222. See supra Part IV.E (analyzing how federal circuits treat exclusion of eyewitness 
identification expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403).  
 223. Supra Part III.A. 
 224. See supra Part IV.E.1 (describing how the Progressive Minority still generally 
allows a Rule 403 exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony).  
THROUGH THE LENS OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULE 403 801 
guidance for the lower courts on when they should admit or exclude 
eyewitness expert testimony, a new solution is needed. 
V.  Potential Solutions and Recommendation 
Eyewitness identification expert testimony is the only effective means 
of educating the jury about the inherent reliability problems with 
eyewitness identifications.225  Numerous studies have found that cross-
examination and jury instructions are inadequate alternatives to eyewitness 
identification expert testimony.226  Cross-examination does not effectively 
increase juror awareness of the reliability problems intrinsic in eyewitness 
testimony.227  Similarly, jury instructions do not sufficiently increase juror 
sensitivity to the memory and perception issues of eyewitness testimony, 
and in fact, have a tendency to confuse the jury and make them less 
receptive to potential reliability issues.228  Eyewitness expert testimony 
should be routinely admitted whenever an eyewitness takes the stand.  To 
achieve this, a solution which aims to combat the problem of eyewitness 
identification expert testimony exclusion under Federal Evidence Rule 403 
is needed.  Thus, this Note now analyzes the potential parameters which 
could be placed on the admission of expert testimony in this area and the 
respective value of each alternative.  
A.  Judicial Solution:  Global Adoption of the Progressive 
Minority Approach 
The first potential solution is a global adoption by all the circuit courts 
of the Progressive Minority’s approach to eyewitness identification expert 
testimony.  The Progressive Minority recognizes the importance of 
eyewitness identification expert testimony and as a general rule tends to 
                                                                                                                 
 225. See, e.g., Harmon M. Hosch et al., Influence of Expert Testimony Regarding 
Eyewitness Accuracy on Jury Decisions, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 294 (1980) 
(concluding that numerous studies conducted on the impact of eyewitness expert testimony 
on juries have revealed that the presentation of expert testimony significantly influences the 
jurors’ beliefs about memory accuracy).  
 226. See supra Part II.C (describing cross-examination and jury instructions as 
unacceptable alternatives to eyewitness identification expert testimony). 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. 
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favor admission.229  In particular, this approach has held that eyewitness 
expert testimony should be "presumptively admissible" when the state’s 
case is based primarily on eyewitness testimony.230  In terms of Federal 
Evidence Rule 403, the Downing court gave specific guidance as to how the 
balancing test should be conducted with regard to eyewitness identification 
expert testimony.231  The Progressive Minority emphasized the importance 
of eyewitness identification expert testimony in enhancing the "truth-
seeking function of the trial," especially where eyewitness evidence is the 
only evidence proffered by the government.232  Specifically, "usurping the 
role of the jury" and avoiding a "battle of the experts" have been declared 
unacceptable reasons for a Rule 403 exclusion.233  The Progressive 
Minority also discourages exclusion under Federal Evidence Rule 403 for 
"confusion" or "delay" where eyewitness identification is the only 
evidence.234  
This solution is a significant improvement on the Majority Approach’s 
general distaste for eyewitness identification expert testimony admissibility 
and blanket deference to Rule 403 exclusions.  One of the main strengths in 
the Progressive Minority’s approach is that it has begun to address the 
multiple avenues for eyewitness expert testimony exclusion.  Not only have 
the circuits declared their general acceptance of the scientific validity and 
importance of eyewitness expert testimony under Rule 702, but they have 
also begun to place limitations on the Rule 403 exclusion avenue.  
However, this approach still has problems.  Although the Downing court 
noted the potential value in eyewitness expert testimony, it also specifically 
stated that in certain situations exclusion under Rule 403 is still possible if 
the probative value is outweighed by other dangers.235  Additionally, expert 
                                                                                                                 
 229. See supra Part IV.C (describing the "progressive minority" and the approach of the 
Third and Sixth Circuits). 
 230. United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 231. See Smithers, 212 F.3d at 313 (noting the importance of expert testimony on 
eyewitness reliability, particularly when the state’s case is based primarily on eyewitness 
testimony); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting "the 
liberal standard of admissibility mandated by Rule 702"). 
 232. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1243 ("The availability of Rule 403 is especially significant 
when there is evidence of a defendant’s guilt other than eyewitness evidence, e.g., 
fingerprints, or other physical evidence."). 
 233. Id. at 1243 n.27. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 1239 ("The danger that scientific evidence will mislead the jury might be 
greater, for example, where the jury is not presented with the data on which the expert relies, 
but must instead accept the expert’s assertions as to the accuracy of his conclusions."). 
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testimony is only presumptively admissible when eyewitness testimony is 
the main thrust of the government’s case.  This passive approach still grants 
trial judges a tremendous amount of discretion if there is any corroborating 
evidence in the facts of their case to determine whether they feel admission 
is appropriate.  The appellate courts will continue to find a potential abuse 
of discretion under Federal Evidence Rule 403 only if the trial court 
excluded expert testimony when the government’s proffered evidence is 
solely eyewitness testimony.  The Progressive Minority has begun to affect 
change at the appellate level, but the discretion granted at the trial level is a 
significant impediment to the potential for any real and uniform change.  A 
much stronger solution is needed in order to attempt true reform in the area 
of eyewitness identification expert testimony admissibility.  
B.  Legislative Solution:  Specialized Relevance Rule 
A specialized relevance rule reflects Congress’s judgment that, as a 
matter of law, the evidence it governs fails a Federal Evidence Rule 403 
balancing test.236  As discussed earlier in this Note, specialized relevance 
rules are congressional proclamations that public policy concerns warrant a 
limit to judicial discretion under Rule 403 for a narrow category of 
evidence.237  A solution is to take the idea of creating a rule limiting judicial 
discretion under Rule 403 and apply it to the eyewitness identification 
expert testimony situation.  The current specialized relevance rules 
proclaim that in certain situations the evidence fails a Rule 403 balancing 
test.  An effective specialized relevance rule in the eyewitness identification 
context would invert this model and state that in most situations eyewitness 
identification expert testimony succeeds a 403 balancing test.  To 
demonstrate the idea, I have drafted an example: 
Federal Evidence Rule *** 
Expert testimony proffered to highlight the inherent reliability 
issues present in eyewitness identification is NOT, in any 




                                                                                                                 
 236. See supra Part III.C (describing the specialized relevance rules and how they 
interact with Rule 403). 
 237. Id.  
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Misleading. 
However, such expert testimony may be excluded under Rule 403 
in limited circumstances for undue delay or waste of time when, 
due to testimony from multiple experts, the proffered testimony 
becomes cumulative or needless.  
The above rule would remove the discretion currently granted to trial 
judges to determine that eyewitness identification expert testimony is 
"unduly prejudicial," "confusing," or "misleading."238   
This is a strong solution that would have the immediate and resolute 
effect of limiting judicial discretion to exclude eyewitness expert testimony 
under Federal Evidence Rule 403.  Erroneous eyewitness identification has 
had a negative effect on both perceived and actual procedural justice in the 
federal courts.  Public policy calls for this necessary legislative action.  This 
specialized relevance rule should not be seen as drastic because it is not 
ratifying extreme change or permitting a result which would have 
previously been disallowed under Rule 403.  In fact the proposed rule is 
merely enacting the result that should be reached under a proper Rule 403 
balancing test.  The scientific validity of eyewitness expert testimony and 
the social science revealing the fallibility of eyewitness testimony is 
virtually universally accepted.239  Additionally, studies demonstrate that 
eyewitness expert testimony is the only effective mechanism by which to 
inform the jury of these findings.  Thus, there is no need for eyewitness 
expert testimony to ever be excluded under Rule 403 for undue prejudice, 
confusion of issues, or misleading the jury.  Additionally, if multiple 
eyewitness experts testify, the proposed specialized relevance rule would 
continue to allow judges to exclude expert testimony that becomes needless 
or cumulative and merely wastes time.  This proposed rule is necessary not 
because Rule 403 is flawed, but because the federal courts habitually 
condone eyewitness expert testimony exclusions justified under flawed 
balancing analyses. 
An argument can be made that this legislative solution is merely a 
small reform in the area of Federal Evidence Rule 403 and will not 
significantly affect eyewitness expert testimony admissibility under Rule 
702 and Daubert.  Though Rule 403 is a significant part of the exclusion 
problem, most eyewitness expert testimony is also excluded under Rule 702 
and similar "cocktail rulings."240  Courts will still be free to hold that 
                                                                                                                 
 238. FED. R. EVID. 403.  
 239. See supra Part II (describing the social science behind eyewitness identifications). 
 240. See supra Part III.B (describing "cocktail rulings" as rulings that combine 
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eyewitness expert testimony is within the common knowledge of the jury 
and therefore it does not "assist the trier of fact."241  Though there is truth in 
this argument, I do not believe it outweighs the potential value in the 
proposed rule.  The Progressive Minority has already planted the seeds of 
change and recognizes the importance of eyewitness expert testimony under 
Rule 702.242  Additionally, even the Majority Approach has conceded that 
in narrow circumstances where the government’s case rests solely on 
eyewitness testimony the admission of expert testimony may be 
necessary.243  The proposed specialized relevance rule will not only limit 
judicial discretion to exclude eyewitness testimony under Rule 403, but it 
also has the potential to create a powerful ripple effect that will push the 
majority of circuits to adopt the Progressive Minority approach.  The 
proposed specialized relevance rule is not just a necessary limitation to 
judicial discretion, it is a congressional proclamation that eyewitness expert 
testimony has value and that a significant problem existed that warranted 
legislative action.  
C.  Recommendation 
I recommend that Congress adopt a specialized relevance rule 
addressing eyewitness identification expert testimony exclusion under 
Federal Evidence Rule 403 such as the one proffered in the previous 
section.244  This is the superior solution for a variety of reasons.  First, it 
combats the problem of the virtually unfettered discretion currently granted 
to trial judges.  Given that the majority of appellate courts are currently 
unwilling to reverse an exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony, except in 
the most egregious situations, this is a necessary solution.245  The social 
science in this area has grown exponentially in recent years, revealing 
conclusively that erroneous eyewitness identification is the most common 
                                                                                                                 
exclusions under Rule 403, 702 and other evidence rules).  
 241. FED.  R. EVID. 702; see supra Part IV.B (describing circuits that have held expert 
testimony is common knowledge and does not assist the jury).  
 242. Supra Part IV.C. 
 243. Supra Part IV.B. 
 244. See supra Part V.B (proposing a legislative solution and drafting a new specialized 
relevance rule). 
 245. See supra Part IV.B (describing "the majority approach" and noting that most 
federal circuits take a "discretionary approach" and almost always defer to the district court’s 
decision on whether to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification).  
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reason for innocent people being convicted.246  It is no longer acceptable to 
allow judges to make policy determinations based on whether they 
personally believe this type of expert testimony is valuable.  A specialized 
relevance rule will begin to combat judicial discretion at the ground level.  
The Progressive Minority approach, while recognizing the importance of 
eyewitness expert testimony, does not guarantee its admission and still 
allows for exclusion in the federal district courts.  A specialized relevance 
rule, in contrast, will create immediate uniformity in the lower courts with 
respect to the exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony under Federal 
Evidence Rule 403.  A solution which enacts reform from the ground up is 
a stronger and more powerful way to affect change.  
Second, this solution continues to allow for the relevancy of 
eyewitness expert testimony as it pertains to the facts of each particular case 
to be examined under Federal Evidence Rule 702 and the Daubert two-step 
analysis.247  Thus, under Rule 702 it is still possible to limit the scope of the 
eyewitness expert’s testimony as it relates to the facts of the case.248  For 
example, in a case with a white defendant and a white eyewitness, Rule 702 
could exclude expert testimony regarding cross-racial identification249 
because it does not "assist the finder of fact."250  The proposed specialized 
relevance rule is limited and defines the narrow situations where it is 
appropriate or inappropriate to exclude eyewitness identification expert 
testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403.  However, by keeping the 
existing structure of Rule 702 and the Daubert standard intact, this solution 
has retained a limited amount of discretion and flexibility to exclude or 
                                                                                                                 
 246. See The Innocence Project, Fact Sheet on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.ph
p (last visited Mar. 23, 2011) (finding that "Eyewitness [m]isidentification [t]estimony was a 
factor in 74 percent of post-conviction DNA exoneration cases in the U.S.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 247. See supra Part III.B (describing Federal Evidence Rule 702 and the Daubert 
standard and their relationship to Federal Evidence Rule 403).  
 248. FED. R. EVID. 702:  
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to 
the facts of the case. 
 249. See supra note 38 (describing the problems inherent in cross-racial 
identifications).  
 250. FED. R. EVID. 702.  
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narrow the scope of eyewitness expert testimony if it is not relevant to a 
particular case.  
Third, this solution is in accordance with the legislative history and 
purpose of Federal Evidence Rule 403.251  Courts have almost uniformly 
concluded that Congress intended exclusion under Rule 403 to be an 
"exceptional, extraordinary remedy" to be used "sparingly."252  Rule 403 
delineated a confined set of circumstances where exclusion would be 
appropriate.253  The Federal Evidence Rule used language such as "undue" 
and "substantially outweigh" to emphasize that generally the balancing test 
should favor admission.254  Federal Evidence Rule 403 was never meant to 
give a carte blanche of discretion to federal judges, especially where the 
availability of alternative means of proof have been demonstrated to be 
ineffective.255 
And last, a specialized relevance rule, though limited to Rule 403, has 
the potential to provide broader guidance to the federal circuit courts in that 
it will be a congressional determination that eyewitness identification 
expert testimony is valuable.  Like many areas of reform in our country’s 
past, often it is Congress who must take the first step and proclaim that the 
time has come to acknowledge a problem exists and define the parameters 
of a solution.  After Congress takes the first step, the federal courts will 
begin to feel more comfortable accepting eyewitness identification expert 
testimony generally.  The proposed specialized relevance rule has the 
potential to lead the circuit courts that currently disfavor eyewitness expert 
testimony admission to adopt the Progressive Minority approach.  A 
legislative determination that eyewitness identification expert testimony is 
                                                                                                                 
 251. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the legislative history and purpose behind Rule 
403). 
 252. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 906 (noting Congress’ purpose in enacting 
Rule 403 and arguing the rule should be interpreted narrowly so as not to improperly 
resurrect the common law rules of evidence). "Congress intended that judges would invoke 
this drastic remedy sparingly and infrequently."  Id.; see also supra Part III.A (analyzing the 
legislative history and purpose behind Federal Evidence Rule 403). 
 253. See supra Part III.A (noting that the legislative history of Rule 403 reveals the 
language of the rule was drafted to limit judicial discretion by narrowing exclusion to a 
confined set of circumstances). 
 254. Supra Part III.A. 
 255. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee notes ("In reaching a decision whether 
to exclude on the grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable 
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.  The availability of other 
means of proof may also be an appropriate factor."); see also supra Part II.C (describing 
cross-examination and jury instructions as ineffective alternatives to eyewitness expert 
testimony).  
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important can affect widespread change and shift the trend to one where 
eyewitness expert testimony is presumptively admissible. 
VI.  Conclusion 
An examination of the admissibility of eyewitness identification expert 
testimony through the lens of Federal Evidence Rule 403 has revealed a 
disturbing trend in the federal circuit courts to use this "extreme" remedy to 
block a now well-established body of social science from our nation’s 
courtrooms.  The story of Julius Ruffin represents thousands of similar 
cases which play out across our country every day.256  Mr. Ruffin was rare 
and lucky in the sense that he had DNA in the system and was eventually 
exonerated.  This is not true of many defendants who are trapped by a web 
of circumstantial evidence and a confident but mistaken eyewitness who 
took the stand and said, "He is the one!" 
Today, a majority of federal circuit courts continues to disfavor the 
admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony.257  Given the years 
of social science evidence emphasizing the reliability problems inherent in 
eyewitness identifications and the statistics tracking the growing number of 
exonerations based on erroneous eyewitness identifications, it is no longer 
tolerable to accept this trend.  The Progressive Minority has taken noble 
steps towards reform and recognizes the general importance of eyewitness 
expert testimony admissibility.258  However, this passive acceptance of 
expert testimony at the appellate level is not enough to combat the problem 
of excess judicial discretion and hostility towards eyewitness expert 
testimony that has seeped deep into the federal district courts.259  
This Note recommends a legislative solution that limits judicial 
discretion to exclude eyewitness expert testimony under Rule 403.260  The 
proposed specialized relevance rule will prohibit unnecessary and erroneous 
exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony under Rule 403.  However, this 
solution has the power to ignite a change that will extend much further than 
                                                                                                                 
 256. See supra note 2 (describing the wrongful conviction and exoneration of Julius 
Ruffin). 
 257. See supra Part IV.B (describing the majority approach towards eyewitness expert 
testimony admission in the federal circuit courts). 
 258. See supra Part IV.C (describing the Progressive Minority approach).  
 259. See supra Part V.A (describing the strengths of the Progressive Minority’s 
approach but noting that weaknesses still remain). 
 260. See supra Part V.B–C (describing and recommending a new specialized relevance 
rule). 
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eyewitness expert testimony exclusion under Rule 403.  This legislative 
proclamation valuing eyewitness expert testimony will send a message to 
the federal circuit courts that the Progressive Minority is on the right track.  
This proposed legislative solution is an attempt to begin to solve a problem 
that has eroded and polluted our justice system for years.  A specialized 
relevance rule limiting the discretion of federal district court judges to 
exclude eyewitness expert testimony is a foundational repair that has the 
strength to support and ignite a universal trend of routine eyewitness expert 
testimony admissibility.  
